# The Theory of Moral Sentiments *Published 1759 by Andrew Millar, Edinburgh. Six editions published during Smith's lifetime, the last in 1790. Author: [[Adam Smith]], Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. The book Smith considered his masterpiece — not [[The Wealth of Nations]] (1776) — and the book that free-market ideologues systematically ignore because it demolishes the caricature of Smith they depend on. The Theory of Moral Sentiments establishes that Smith's economic thinking was embedded in a moral framework grounded in sympathy, mutual obligation, and social accountability — the exact framework that [[Free Market Fundamentalism]] strips away when it invokes Smith's name.* ## The argument ### Sympathy as the moral foundation Smith's central claim: human beings are fundamentally social and moral creatures whose capacity for ethical judgment arises from **sympathy** — the ability to imaginatively enter into another person's experience and feel what they feel. Sympathy is not a choice or a virtue; it is a basic psychological mechanism. We cannot help imagining ourselves in the position of the person we observe, and this imaginative identification is the foundation of all moral judgment. Smith is not arguing that people are naturally good. He is arguing that people are naturally *social* — that the capacity to take another's perspective is wired into human psychology, and that this capacity generates moral sentiments (approval, disapproval, gratitude, resentment, justice, mercy) that regulate social life. The moral sentiments are not products of reason or religion; they are products of social interaction itself. ### The impartial spectator Smith's most important conceptual innovation: the **impartial spectator** — an internalized, imagined observer who represents the perspective of a fair, well-informed, disinterested person. The impartial spectator is not a real person; it is a mental construct — a kind of internal judge that each person develops through social experience. The mechanism: when we act, we imagine how our actions would appear to an impartial spectator — someone who has no personal stake in the outcome, who knows the relevant facts, and who judges according to general principles rather than personal interest. When our actions would earn the impartial spectator's approval, we feel morally satisfied; when they would earn disapproval, we feel guilt or shame. The impartial spectator is Smith's solution to the problem of moral objectivity: how can moral judgments be more than mere personal preference? Smith's answer: they are more than personal preference because they are disciplined by the imaginative practice of taking the perspective of a fair observer. The impartial spectator is not infallible — it can be corrupted by custom, fashion, ideology, or self-interest — but it provides a standard against which moral claims can be evaluated. ### Self-interest and its limits *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* does not deny that people are self-interested. Smith explicitly acknowledges self-interest as a powerful motive. But he embeds self-interest within a broader framework of social sentiments: - **Self-interest is not the only motive.** Sympathy, the desire for approval, the fear of disapproval, the sense of justice, and the need for social belonging are all independent motives that constrain and shape self-interested behavior - **Self-interest requires social legitimacy.** The pursuit of wealth and status is not autonomous — it operates within a framework of social norms and moral expectations. The person who pursues wealth in ways that violate the impartial spectator's standards loses the social approval that makes wealth satisfying - **Self-interest can be self-deceiving.** Smith identifies the human tendency to overestimate the importance of wealth and status, to pursue material goods beyond the point where they contribute to genuine well-being. This is not a minor footnote — it is a central concern of the book ### The "Adam Smith Problem" For more than a century, scholars have debated the relationship between *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (grounded in sympathy and social sentiment) and *[[The Wealth of Nations]]* (famous for the invisible hand and the pursuit of self-interest). The so-called "Adam Smith Problem" (*das Adam Smith Problem*, first identified by German scholars in the 19th century) asks: how can the same thinker ground ethics in sympathy and economics in self-interest? Are the two books contradictory? The contemporary scholarly consensus: **they are not contradictory.** Smith intended *The Wealth of Nations* to be read within the moral framework established by *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* The invisible hand operates within, not instead of, the moral sentiments. Markets work because participants are embedded in social relationships governed by sympathy, justice, and the impartial spectator. When those moral constraints are removed — when self-interest operates without social accountability — the result is not a well-functioning market but predation, fraud, and exploitation. Smith himself signaled this by continuing to revise *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* throughout his life, publishing the final (sixth) edition in 1790, the year of his death — fourteen years after *The Wealth of Nations.* He never treated the later book as superseding the earlier one. ## KB significance **1. The selective-reading diagnostic.** The KB's analysis of [[Free Market Fundamentalism]] and [[Neoliberalism]] depends on recognizing that the ideological tradition running from Hayek through Friedman through the Koch-funded policy apparatus invokes [[Adam Smith]] while ignoring *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* The "Adam Smith" of conservative economic ideology — the thinker who proved that unregulated self-interest produces optimal social outcomes — is a caricature. The actual Adam Smith argued that self-interest operates within and is constrained by a moral framework grounded in sympathy and social accountability. **2. The moral-framework argument.** Smith's argument that markets require a moral infrastructure — sympathy, justice, the impartial spectator, social norms of fairness — is the philosophical counter to the claim that markets are self-regulating. The KB tracks the consequences of removing moral constraints from market activity: regulatory capture, corporate predation, the financialization of the economy, the destruction of communities by unconstrained capital mobility. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* provides the philosophical foundation for understanding *why* unregulated markets fail: because they operate outside the moral framework that their architect insisted they required. **3. The impartial-spectator standard.** Smith's impartial spectator provides a philosophical benchmark for evaluating political and economic claims. The question "would an impartial spectator approve?" is a powerful analytical tool for cutting through self-serving rhetoric — and for identifying the gap between how political actors describe their motives and how those motives would appear to a disinterested observer. **4. The [[The Wealth of Nations]] complement.** This page should be read alongside [[The Wealth of Nations]] to understand Smith's complete system. The KB's free-market-ideology entries document what happens when one half of Smith is read without the other: when the invisible hand is invoked without the impartial spectator, when self-interest is celebrated without sympathy, when economic efficiency is pursued without moral accountability. ## See Also - [[Adam Smith]] — the author - [[The Wealth of Nations]] — the companion work; Smith's economic analysis within this moral framework - [[Free Market Fundamentalism]] — the ideological tradition that selectively reads Smith - [[Neoliberalism]] — the policy framework that claims Smith's authority - [[Milton Friedman]] · [[Capitalism and Freedom]] — the 20th-century tradition that inherits Smith selectively - [[Friedrich Hayek]] · [[The Road to Serfdom]] — the Hayekian tradition's relationship to Smith