# Ballot Marking Device A **ballot marking device (BMD)** is a machine on which a voter makes selections on a screen and which then prints a paper record of those selections. The printed card typically carries both human-readable text and a barcode or QR code, and in most deployments the tabulator reads the **code**, not the text. That split is the central criticism. Verification and tabulation read different objects, and nothing on the card lets a voter confirm that the two agree. ## Who uses them [[Verified Voting]]'s equipment data, projected for 2024, put about **69%** of registered voters in jurisdictions where most voters hand-mark paper ballots, about **25%** where every in-person voter uses a BMD, and about **5%** on paperless machines. Those exact shares come from one secondary report (PolitiFact, 2023). Georgia is the largest all-BMD state, with [[Dominion Voting Systems]] equipment statewide since 2020. Hand-marked-paper jurisdictions still keep at least one BMD in each polling place, for the reason below. ## The case for them: accessibility The [[Help America Vote Act]] (§ 301(a)(3)(B)) requires at least one voting system equipped for voters with disabilities at every polling place. A BMD lets a blind voter, or a voter who cannot hold a pen, vote privately and without help. Disability-rights groups such as the National Disability Rights Network have pressed for the most accessible equipment available. That is why even the critics' preferred design keeps one BMD per polling place instead of none. ## The case against them - **Appel, DeMillo and Stark (2020).** Their *Election Law Journal* paper argues that most voters do not review a BMD printout, and those who do often miss changes. A printout that may not match what the voter chose is not evidence an audit can rely on, so even a perfect [[Risk-Limiting Audit]] cannot confirm the outcome. - **Bernhard et al. (IEEE S&P 2020).** In a mock election in Ann Arbor with 241 participants, 40% looked at their printout and **6.6%** reported a deliberately altered vote. With prompting and signage, detection ranged from 6.7% to 86%. - **The counter-finding.** A Rice University study (Kortum et al., 2022) found 99.8% accuracy when voters were explicitly told to check. The dispute is over whether real polling places will ever tell them. ## The barcode fights, 2025–26 The critique jumped from the journals into policy at two levels of government in the same cycle. - **Federal.** Section 4(b)(i) of [[Executive Order - Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections]] (March 25, 2025) directs that systems "not use a ballot in which a vote is contained within a barcode or quick-response code in the vote counting process except where necessary to accommodate individuals with disabilities." It also tells the [[Election Assistance Commission]] to review and rescind affected certifications within 180 days. On **January 9, 2026** Judge John H. Chun (W.D. Wash.) held that the directive unlawfully dictates an outcome Congress left to the EAC's own process. He permanently enjoined it **for Washington and Oregon**, the plaintiff states. - **Georgia.** SB 189 (2024) banned counting votes from "a QR code, bar code, or similar coding" from July 1, 2026, without paying for replacement equipment. The 2026 regular session failed to pass a delay. A June special session passed **SB 3EX** (House 94–79, Senate 36–16), and [[Brian Kemp]] signed it on **June 25, 2026**. It keeps QR tabulation until 2028; sources disagree on whether the deadline is January 1 or July 1. The bill also adds automatic hand recounts within 0.5% for the top two statewide races and hands equipment selection to a legislative committee. A floor amendment points that committee toward hand-marked paper with ballot-on-demand printing. Georgia votes on QR codes in November 2026. ## See Also - [[Ballot Marking Validity Crosswalk]]: the mark-validity rules that do not apply to a device-printed ballot, and the separate standard § 21081(a)(6) requires for this kind of system - [[How a Ballot Is Counted]] · [[Hand-Marked Paper Ballot]] · [[Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail]] - [[How a Voting System Is Certified and Decertified]] · [[Voluntary Voting System Guidelines]] - [[Optical Scan Voting System]] · [[Cast Vote Record]] · [[Verified Voting]] - [[Brad Raffensperger]] · [[Election Systems & Software]]