# Section 232 **Section 232** of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (signed by [[John F. Kennedy]] on October 11, 1962) lets the president "adjust the imports" of any product that the [[Department of Commerce]] finds is being imported "in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." It is the tariff authority that survived [[Learning Resources v. Trump]] intact, and by October 2026 it had become the load-bearing wall of the second Trump administration's trade regime: steel, aluminum, copper, autos, trucks, lumber, furniture, chips, drugs, drones and solar inputs all sit under it. The vault tracks it for a structural reason. When the Supreme Court struck down the [[International Emergency Economic Powers Act]] tariffs on February 20, 2026, the authorities left standing were the ones Congress had written explicitly as tariff delegations. Section 232 is the oldest and broadest of them, and Congress has never taken it back. ## The statutory mechanism The process has four steps, with deadlines set by the statute (per CRS): 1. **Investigation.** Commerce (through its Bureau of Industry and Security) opens an investigation on request or on its own motion. It has **270 days** to report to the president whether the imports threaten to impair national security. 2. **Presidential decision.** The president has **90 days** after receiving the report to decide whether he concurs and, if so, the "nature and duration" of the action. 3. **Implementation.** Action must be implemented within **15 days** of the decision, with a written statement to Congress within 30 days and publication in the Federal Register. 4. **No sunset.** Nothing in the statute makes a 232 action expire. Tariffs stay until a later proclamation changes them, and the Federal Circuit has allowed presidents to modify rates long after the original deadlines (Lawfare's summary of the 2021–2023 Federal Circuit line). Three features make it powerful. "National security" is undefined and has been read to include the economic health of domestic industry. The remedy is open-ended: tariffs, quotas, minimum import prices, negotiated agreements. And courts defer heavily on the security finding itself. In *Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG* (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the use of the provision to impose license fees on oil imports, and that precedent anchored every later challenge. ## History: a dormant tool, then the main one Before Trump, Section 232 was rarely used. Commerce opened 26 investigations between 1963 and 2017, issued negative findings 62% of the time, and presidents acted only six times on positive findings (CRS, Dec 2020). Most of those actions concerned oil imports in the 1970s and 1980s. The first Trump administration changed that. In March 2018, Proclamations 9705 and 9704 imposed **25% tariffs on steel and 10% on aluminum**, effective March 23, 2018. They hit allies (Canada, the EU, Japan) as well as rivals. Several countries later negotiated quotas or exemptions instead. A 2019 auto investigation produced a finding but no tariffs during the first term. The steel tariffs drew the main constitutional test. In *American Institute for International Steel v. United States*, importers argued that Section 232 was an unconstitutional delegation of Congress's taxing power. The [[Court of International Trade]] rejected the claim on March 25, 2019, citing *Algonquin*. The Federal Circuit affirmed in February 2020, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 22, 2020. ## Second-term expansion (2025–2026) The second administration turned the provision from a metals tool into a sector-by-sector industrial policy. According to CSIS (July 2026), Commerce opened 13 investigations in the second term. Every proclamation below is confirmed in the Federal Register. | Product | Rate | Effective | Source | |---|---|---|---| | Steel (first term) | 25% | Mar 23, 2018 | Proclamation 9705 | | Aluminum (first term) | 10% | Mar 23, 2018 | Proclamation 9704 | | Steel: all country exemptions ended | 25%, derivatives added | Mar 12, 2025 | Proclamation 10896 | | Aluminum | raised from 10% to 25% | Mar 12, 2025 | Proclamation 10895 | | Steel and aluminum | raised from 25% to 50% (UK held at 25%) | Jun 4, 2025 | Proclamation 10947 | | Automobiles and parts | 25% (parts no later than May 3, 2025) | Apr 3, 2025 | Proclamation 10908 | | Semi-finished copper and copper-intensive derivatives | 50% (refined cathode excluded) | Aug 1, 2025 | Proclamation 10962 | | Softwood timber and lumber; upholstered wood furniture, kitchen cabinets, vanities | 10%; 25% | Oct 14, 2025 | Proclamation 10976 | | Scheduled furniture and cabinet increases (to 30% and 50%) | delayed one year | Jan 1, 2027 | Proclamation 11000 | | Medium- and heavy-duty trucks and parts; buses | 25%; 10% | Nov 1, 2025 | Proclamation 10984 | | Processed critical minerals | no tariff; negotiations ordered | Jan 14, 2026 | Proclamation 11001 | | Certain advanced computing chips | 25%, with broad exemptions for U.S. data-center, R&D and startup use | Jan 15, 2026 | Proclamation 11002 | | Steel, aluminum, copper restructured | 50% or 25% on full customs value; 15% for grid and industrial equipment through 2027; 10% if made from U.S. metal | Apr 6, 2026 | Proclamation 11021 | | Metals adjustment | farm equipment and residential HVAC moved to 15%; new 25% tier with 15% caps for partners | Jun 8, 2026 | Proclamation 11032 | | Patented pharmaceuticals and ingredients | 100% (15% EU, Japan, Korea, Switzerland; generics exempt) | Jul 31, 2026 (listed firms); Sept 29, 2026 (all others) | Proclamation 11020 | | Primary aluminum, new U.S. capacity | half the 232 rate for firms that build or expand U.S. smelters | signed Jul 20, 2026 | Proclamation 11045 | | Drones (UAS) | 100% over 25 kg or with thermal imaging; 25% smaller | Sept 3, 2026 (some components Feb 9, 2027) | Proclamation 11055 | | Polysilicon, wafers, solar cells and modules | minimum import prices plus 15% | Dec 4, 2026 | Proclamation 11052 | Several features stand out. - **The rate is a bargaining chip.** Nearly every proclamation from mid-2025 on writes in lower rates for partners that signed framework deals. The EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and (often) Taiwan are capped at 15%. The UK gets 10% or less. Pharmaceutical tariffs fall to 20% for companies with approved onshoring plans, and to zero for companies that sign most-favored-nation drug-pricing agreements (Proclamation 11020). A tariff justified by national security is being priced against investment pledges and drug prices. - **Derivatives keep growing.** The 2025–26 metals actions taxed downstream goods made with steel, aluminum and copper. In April 2026, Proclamation 11021 moved from taxing metal content to taxing the **full customs value** of the product, while dropping hundreds of low-metal items (CFR; White & Case). Lawfare notes the derivative concept is statutorily undefined: canned beer is taxed as an aluminum "derivative." - **Not every finding becomes a tariff.** Critical minerals (January 2026) and commercial aircraft and jet engines (July 2026) produced affirmative findings that led to negotiation directives rather than duties (Federal Register; CFR; CSIS). - **Refined copper is still open.** Proclamation 10962 asked Commerce for a June 30, 2026 update on a phased duty on refined copper, 15% from January 1, 2027 and 30% from 2028. No decision was found in the Federal Register as of this writing. One adjacent action is often misfiled here: the August 2026 50% tariff on Canadian furniture and wood products rests on Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, not Section 232 (CFR; Wyden release, July 22, 2026). ## Why it survived Learning Resources The Supreme Court's February 20, 2026 decision held that IEEPA, which says nothing about tariffs or duties, does not authorize them. Section 232 is the reverse case. It is a delegation Congress wrote specifically about imports, with an investigative process, a factual predicate and a remedy that includes tariffs. According to Lawfare (Feb 25, 2026), the majority opinion "did not directly address the scope of the president's tariff authorities under other statutes," and *Algonquin* plus the Federal Circuit's 2020–2023 rulings leave 232 on firm ground. The live vulnerabilities are narrower. Lawfare lists four: findings that have gone "substantively stale," the undefined reach of "derivative" products, the procedures for adding products, and tariffs, such as those on upholstered furniture, that sit far from any ordinary meaning of national security. Courts have so far deferred on all four. After *Learning Resources*, the administration's trade regime rests on three statutes. The temporary **Section 122** surcharge ran February–July 24, 2026. The [[Section 301 Forced Labor Tariffs]] under the [[Trade Act of 1974]] took effect July 24, 2026. And Section 232 covers the sectoral tariffs. Of the three, only 232 has no expiry date and no country-practice predicate. ## Pending investigations (as of October 2026) From Covington (April 2026), CSIS (July 2026), CFR (September 2026) and the ICPA tracker (October 4, 2026): - **Wind turbines and components.** Opened August 13, 2025. - **Personal protective equipment, medical consumables and equipment.** Opened September 2, 2025. - **Robotics and industrial machinery.** Opened September 2, 2025. CFR reports the administration is weighing tariffs. - **Anthracite coal.** Opened June 29, 2026 (CSIS; also listed by CFR). - **Semiconductor manufacturing equipment and broader chips.** Left open after the narrow January 2026 action. The ICPA tracker lists SME as open. CSIS notes that most of these reports are past their 270-day deadline, and that missed deadlines carry no penalty. ## The political point Section 232 is the clearest case in the vault of a delegation outliving its design. Written in 1962 as a safety valve for defense-critical industries, it now carries tariffs on kitchen cabinets and patented drugs, with rates negotiated against investment pledges. The courts have upheld the delegation and treat the security finding as close to unreviewable, which leaves Congress as the only check. Congress has not used it. The bills to claw the power back have bipartisan sponsors and no enactments: - **Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act** (2018–2019). Led by [[Pat Toomey]] and [[Mark Warner]], it would have required congressional approval of new 232 actions. It never reached a floor vote. - **Trade Review Act of 2025** (S. 1272). Introduced April 3, 2025 by Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and [[Chuck Grassley]] (R-IA), with 13 cosponsors (7 Republicans, 6 Democrats). It would make any new or increased tariff expire after 60 days without a joint resolution of approval. The White House threatened a veto, and no committee or floor vote has been reported. - **Congressional Trade Powers Reform Act of 2026.** Introduced by [[Ron Wyden]] on July 22, 2026. Section 204 would rewrite Section 232 so a presidential action needs congressional approval before it takes effect. The pattern matches the vault's broader read on executive power. Republican majorities object to the scale of tariffs in principle and decline to vote to limit them. The power that survives judicial review is the one Congress wrote explicitly, and leaving it in place is itself a choice. ## See also [[Tariffs]] · [[Liberation Day Tariffs]] · [[Learning Resources v. Trump]] · [[International Emergency Economic Powers Act]] · [[Trade Act of 1974]] · [[Section 301 Forced Labor Tariffs]] · [[Court of International Trade]] · [[Department of Commerce]] · [[Howard Lutnick]] · [[Jamieson Greer]] · [[Peter Navarro]] · [[Trump China Trade War]] · [[Critical Minerals]] · [[US Steel Nippon Golden Share]] · [[Nondelegation Doctrine]] · [[Major Questions Doctrine]] · [[Smoot-Hawley Tariff]] · [[Economic Nationalism]]