# National Labor Relations Act **Type:** Federal law (P.L. 74-198; the Wagner Act) **Signed:** July 5, 1935 by Franklin D. Roosevelt **Sponsor:** Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-NY) **Vote:** Senate 63-12 | House voice vote ## Summary The foundational federal law establishing the right of private-sector workers to organize unions, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity (including strikes) — and creating the **National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)** to enforce those rights. The NLRA declared that "the denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest" — placing the federal government explicitly on the side of workers' right to organize. The Act was the [[New Deal]]'s labor counterpart to the [[Social Security Act]] — together they established the twin pillars of the mid-century American social contract: social insurance and collective bargaining. The NLRA's enactment produced the most dramatic period of union growth in American history: union membership rose from approximately 13% of the non-agricultural workforce in 1935 to 35% by the mid-1950s, creating the bargaining power that produced the postwar middle class — rising wages, employer-provided health insurance, pensions, the 40-hour work week, and workplace safety standards. ## Key Provisions **Section 7 — Employee rights.** The core of the Act: employees have the right to self-organization, to form or join labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. Section 7 also protects the right to *refrain* from such activities. **Section 8 — Unfair labor practices.** Prohibits employer interference with Section 7 rights, including: domination of labor organizations, discrimination against union members, retaliation against employees who file charges, and refusal to bargain collectively with duly chosen representatives. The Taft-Hartley amendments (1947) added union unfair labor practices as well. **Sections 3-6 — The NLRB.** Created the National Labor Relations Board as an independent federal agency to conduct representation elections, investigate unfair labor practices, and enforce the Act. The NLRB's composition (five members appointed by the president for five-year terms) makes it subject to the political orientation of the appointing president — a structural feature that has made labor law enforcement cyclically dependent on which party holds the White House. ## KB Significance **1. The NLRB capture cycle.** The NLRB's presidentially appointed structure makes it the paradigmatic case of cyclical regulatory capture. Under Democratic presidents, the Board interprets the Act expansively — facilitating union elections, broadening the definition of protected concerted activity, strengthening enforcement against employer unfair labor practices. Under Republican presidents, the Board reverses course — narrowing worker protections, slowing election processes (giving employers more time to campaign against unions), and weakening enforcement. The current administration's NLRB appointments have shifted the Board toward employer-friendly interpretations, continuing the pattern. The Board's cyclical capture is the labor-law version of the FCC revolving door the vault tracks in telecommunications. **2. Right-to-work and the Taft-Hartley erosion.** The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 — passed over Truman's veto — amended the NLRA to allow states to enact "right-to-work" laws prohibiting union security agreements (provisions requiring employees to pay union dues as a condition of employment). Twenty-seven states have enacted right-to-work laws, creating a patchwork of labor-law environments that structurally disadvantages unions in right-to-work states. The term "right-to-work" is the labor-law Barthesian myth: the political content (weakening unions' financial base to reduce their bargaining power and political influence) is presented as a "natural" right (individual freedom not to pay dues). The [[Koch Network]] and the [[Heritage Foundation]] have been the primary institutional advocates for right-to-work laws. **3. The union decline trajectory.** Private-sector union membership has fallen from 35% in the 1950s to approximately 6% today — the most dramatic institutional collapse in modern American political economy. This decline was not natural or inevitable; it was produced by specific policy choices (Taft-Hartley, right-to-work laws, employer anti-union campaigns tolerated by a weakened NLRB), legal interpretations (narrowing the definition of "employee" to exclude gig workers, independent contractors, and other categories), and strategic employer behavior (union avoidance consulting is a multi-billion-dollar industry). The decline of unions is directly correlated with the rise of income inequality — a relationship extensively documented in economic research. The NLRA's promise of collective bargaining as a counterweight to employer power has been structurally undermined. **4. The Amazon/Starbucks moment.** The recent unionization drives at Amazon (the ALU's Staten Island victory, 2022) and Starbucks (450+ stores filing for elections since 2021) represent the most significant private-sector organizing since the NLRA's early decades. These campaigns — led by young, multiracial workers in low-wage service and logistics jobs — test whether the NLRA's framework can function in the 21st-century economy. The employer responses (captive-audience meetings, retaliatory firings, delays in bargaining after election victories, challenges to election results) demonstrate the asymmetry the Act's weakened enforcement creates: workers can win elections but cannot compel employers to bargain in good faith. The [[Senate HELP Committee]]'s labor jurisdiction covers the NLRB's enforcement capacity. **5. The PRO Act stalemate.** The Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act — which would ban captive-audience meetings, impose penalties for employer unfair labor practices, override right-to-work laws for purposes of union security, and extend NLRA protections to gig workers — has passed the House multiple times but been blocked in the Senate by the filibuster. The PRO Act would be the most significant strengthening of the NLRA since its enactment. Its inability to pass despite majority support in both chambers is the labor version of the VRA restoration failure: the filibuster protects the anti-labor status quo against majoritarian change. ## See Also - [[Social Security Act]] — the social-insurance counterpart to the NLRA's collective-bargaining framework - [[Koch Network]] — principal institutional opponent of labor organizing and right-to-work advocate - [[Heritage Foundation]] — policy blueprints for labor deregulation - [[Senate HELP Committee]] — committee of jurisdiction for NLRB and labor policy - [[House Energy and Commerce Committee]] — overlapping jurisdiction for workforce regulation