# Printz v. United States (June 27, 1997) On **June 27, 1997**, the Supreme Court ruled **5–4** in *Printz v. United States* that the federal government cannot compel state or local law enforcement officers to execute federal law — specifically, the interim provisions of the **Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act** (1993) that required local chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers until the national instant-check system (NICS) became operational. Justice [[Antonin Scalia]] wrote the majority opinion, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and [[Clarence Thomas]]. Stevens dissented, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The case established the modern **anti-commandeering doctrine**: the principle that the [[Tenth Amendment]] prohibits the federal government from "commandeering" state and local officials to administer federal regulatory programs. The holding was narrow in its immediate application (it struck down only the Brady Act's interim background-check mandate, which was superseded by NICS in 1998) but expansive in its doctrinal reach — and it became the single most consequential case for the **constitutional sheriff movement**. ## The Plaintiffs: Jay Printz and Richard Mack The case was brought by two county sheriffs who refused to perform the Brady Act's background checks: - **Jay Printz**, Sheriff of Ravalli County, Montana - **Richard Mack**, Sheriff of Graham County, Arizona Mack would go on to found the **Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association (CSPOA)** in 2011, making *Printz* the founding mythology of the constitutional sheriff movement. The NRA funded the litigation and provided legal support. ## The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Scalia's opinion built on *New York v. United States* (1992), which held that Congress cannot compel state legislatures to enact federal regulatory programs. *Printz* extended this principle from state legislatures to state and local executive officers: **1. The structural principle.** The Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty in which the federal government and state governments operate in separate spheres. The federal government has no constitutional authority to direct the operations of state officials, even in furtherance of legitimate federal objectives. **2. Historical practice.** Scalia surveyed early congressional enactments and found no tradition of the federal government commandeering state executive officers to administer federal law. (Stevens's dissent contested this reading of the historical record, citing examples of early federal statutes that imposed duties on state judges and officers.) **3. The accountability problem.** If federal officials can direct state officers to carry out federal policy, voters cannot determine which level of government is responsible for government action — undermining the accountability that federalism is designed to ensure. **4. The remedy.** The Brady Act's interim provisions — requiring CLEOs to conduct background checks — were unconstitutional commandeering. The federal government could operate its own background-check system (which it did, launching NICS in 1998), incentivize state cooperation through funding, or use other constitutional means. It could not order sheriffs to do the work. Thomas's concurrence went further, arguing that the [[Second Amendment]] might independently protect an individual right to bear arms — a preview of the position he would help establish in *[[District of Columbia v. Heller]]* (2008) and extend in *[[NYSRPA v. Bruen]]* (2022). ## The Constitutional Sheriff Marketing Operation *Printz* is a limited holding about federal commandeering of state officers. It does not hold that sheriffs are the supreme law enforcement authority in their counties, that sheriffs can refuse to enforce state laws, or that sheriffs can interpose themselves between federal agents and citizens. The opinion says nothing about sheriff supremacy. **Richard Mack treated it as if it said all of those things.** After *Printz*, Mack built a decades-long career marketing the decision as judicial vindication of the [[Constitutional Sheriff]] doctrine: - His book *The County Sheriff: America's Last Hope* (2009) used *Printz* as the doctrinal centerpiece for the claim that county sheriffs are the highest constitutional authority in the land. - The CSPOA's training materials cite *Printz* as proof that the Supreme Court has ruled the sheriff cannot be compelled by the federal government — eliding the distinction between "cannot be commandeered to execute federal programs" and "has supremacy over federal authority." - The NRA's funding of the *Printz* litigation and Mack's subsequent career trajectory illustrate how a mainstream gun-rights litigation strategy can feed into far-right movement infrastructure. The gap between what *Printz* actually held and what the constitutional sheriff movement claims it held is the clearest example in the KB of **pseudo-legal mythmaking**: a real legal decision repackaged into a doctrine that the decision does not support. ## Broader Anti-Commandeering Applications The anti-commandeering doctrine established in *Printz* has been invoked across the political spectrum: - **Sanctuary cities:** Local jurisdictions refusing to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement (ICE detainers) cite the anti-commandeering principle — the federal government cannot require local police to enforce federal immigration law. - **Marijuana legalization:** States that legalize marijuana operate within the anti-commandeering framework — the federal government cannot compel state police to enforce federal drug prohibition. - **Second Amendment sanctuaries:** Counties declaring they will not enforce state or federal gun regulations cite *Printz* as authority — often through the CSPOA's constitutional sheriff framing. The irony is structurally significant: the same doctrine that the conservative legal movement used to resist federal gun regulation in 1997 now supports liberal cities resisting federal immigration enforcement. The principle is neutral; the deployment is partisan. ## KB Significance 1. **The constitutional sheriff origin myth.** *Printz* is the legal artifact that Richard Mack transformed into the founding document of the constitutional sheriff movement. The movement's legitimacy claim — "the Supreme Court ruled that sheriffs cannot be ordered around by the federal government" — depends on a misreading of *Printz*. But the misreading has been enormously operationally effective: over 400 sheriffs have been trained through the CSPOA, and the doctrine has been deployed on gun rights, COVID resistance, and immigration enforcement. 2. **The NRA-to-militia pipeline.** The *Printz* litigation was a mainstream NRA legal strategy. Its aftermath — Mack's transformation from NRA-funded plaintiff sheriff to CSPOA founder — illustrates how mainstream gun-rights litigation can produce infrastructure for far-right antigovernment movements. The pipeline: NRA funding → Supreme Court victory → constitutional sheriff ideology → CSPOA training network → [[Oath Keepers]] convergence. 3. **The anti-commandeering paradox.** *Printz* created a doctrine that both the right and the left now use to resist federal authority. This structural neutrality is rare in the KB's universe of cases — most Supreme Court holdings operationally benefit one side. The anti-commandeering doctrine's bipartisan utility makes it a genuinely federalist holding in a way that most "federalism" holdings (which tend to serve conservative policy objectives) are not. ## See Also - [[Constitutional Sheriff]] — The movement built on the mythologized version of *Printz* - [[Posse Comitatus]] — The ideological ancestor of the sheriff-supremacy doctrine *Printz* was claimed to validate - [[District of Columbia v. Heller]] — Thomas's *Printz* concurrence previewed the individual-right holding of *Heller* - [[Antonin Scalia]] — Author of the majority opinion - [[Second Amendment Absolutism]] — The broader gun-rights framework within which *Printz* was litigated - [[Supreme Court Rulings Hub]] — The MOC for all SCOTUS cases in the KB