# McCutcheon v. FEC (April 2, 2014) **Citation:** 572 U.S. 185 (2014) **Vote:** 5-4 **Decided:** April 2, 2014 **Statute challenged:** [[Federal Election Campaign Act]] aggregate contribution limits (as raised by [[Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act]]) *McCutcheon v. FEC* struck down the **aggregate biennial limit** on contributions an individual could make to all federal candidates, parties, and PACs combined — the cap that limited the total any one donor could give across the entire federal election system, regardless of how the money was distributed among recipients. The plaintiff was **Shaun McCutcheon**, an Alabama electrical engineer and Republican donor who had hit the aggregate cap during the 2011-12 cycle and challenged it as a [[First Amendment]] violation. The Republican National Committee joined as co-plaintiff. The plurality opinion was authored by Chief Justice [[John Roberts]], joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito; [[Justice Thomas]] concurred in the judgment (would have gone further and struck down individual contribution limits as well). Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. ## The Holding The 1974 [[Federal Election Campaign Act]] Amendments had imposed two distinct types of contribution caps: - **Per-recipient limits:** the maximum any one donor could give to any one candidate, party committee, or PAC - **Aggregate biennial limit:** the maximum any one donor could give across *all* federal recipients combined (in the 2011-12 cycle, $46,200 to candidates and $70,800 to parties and PACs, totaling $117,000) *McCutcheon* struck down only the aggregate limit. Per-recipient limits were left intact (though Justice Thomas's concurrence signaled he would have gone further). The plurality reasoned that the aggregate limit could not be justified by the *Buckley*-permitted anti-quid-pro-quo-corruption rationale, because once per-recipient limits are in place, the marginal additional contribution from a donor at the aggregate cap to a *new* candidate or committee does not create *quid pro quo* corruption with respect to that new recipient. ## The Doctrinal Move The principal doctrinal move was the **narrowing of "corruption."** *McCutcheon* further constrained the *Buckley v. Valeo* definition of "corruption" — the only governmental interest the Court had recognized as justifying campaign-finance restrictions — to mean exclusively **explicit quid pro quo exchange of money for official action.** Broader concerns about access, influence, and democratic distortion were declared constitutionally insufficient. After *McCutcheon*, the only campaign-finance restrictions that can survive First Amendment review are those addressing the narrowest possible definition of corruption. This doctrinal narrowing has structural implications beyond the specific aggregate-limit holding. The same logic suggests that **any** contribution cap could be vulnerable: if the only permissible justification is preventing literal bribery, and per-recipient caps far below what would constitute bribery are required to be analyzed under this narrow rationale, then per-recipient caps themselves are constitutionally suspect. Justice Thomas's concurrence made this implication explicit; the plurality opinion did not, but the logic is consistent. ## Significance for the KB *McCutcheon* completes the contemporary dismantling of the [[Federal Election Campaign Act]] contribution framework that [[Buckley v. Valeo]] had largely preserved. After 2014: 1. **Wealthy donors can give to every federal candidate and committee simultaneously.** A donor with sufficient resources can max out per-recipient contributions to all 435 House candidates, all 33-34 Senate candidates per cycle, both party committees, every congressional-campaign-committee, every state party — totaling several million dollars annually entirely within the *hard money* (regulated) system. 2. **The hard/soft distinction has further eroded in practice.** When a single donor can give $3,300 each to dozens of candidates, the cumulative individual influence approaches what the soft-money ban was designed to prevent. The *McCutcheon* world reproduces, within the hard-money system, the donor-concentration that BCRA's soft-money ban was designed to eliminate. 3. **The Roberts Court's narrow-corruption doctrine is now load-bearing.** The same logic that produced *McCutcheon* protects [[Citizens United v. FEC]], protects [[SpeechNow.org v. FEC]], and would protect future challenges to per-recipient contribution limits. The doctrinal architecture is now substantially complete; what remains is for future cases to apply it. ## See Also - [[Buckley v. Valeo]] — the 1976 doctrinal foundation - [[Citizens United v. FEC]] — the parallel 2010 dismantling on the corporate-spending side - [[Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act]] — the statute whose contribution limits *McCutcheon* affected - [[Federal Election Campaign Act]] — the underlying framework - [[Dark Money]] — the parallel infrastructure - [[Money as Speech]] — the doctrine - [[Federal Election Commission]] — the named defendant - [[Campaign Finance Timeline]] — full chronological view - [[Campaign Finance]] — Foundations hub