# Burdick v. United States Supreme Court decision, 236 U.S. 79, holding that a presidential pardon must be **accepted** to take effect as to its recipient — and that it may therefore be refused. George Burdick, city editor of the *New York Tribune*, declined to name the sources of customs-fraud stories before a federal grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment. President Wilson issued him a full pardon for any related federal offences, which would have removed the criminal exposure his privilege rested on. Burdick refused the pardon and kept refusing to testify. The Court sided with Burdick. A pardon is in the nature of a deed requiring delivery and acceptance; it cannot be forced on an unwilling recipient. The opinion also contains the reasoning most often cited for the proposition that acceptance carries an **imputation of guilt** — the passage that narrows *[[Ex parte Garland]]*'s "blots out the guilt" language, and that explains why a pardon is not a declaration of innocence. The practical significance for the modern pipeline is twofold: a pardon cannot be used to strip a witness of the Fifth Amendment privilege against their will, and a commutation — which is not a forgiveness of the offence — is generally treated as not requiring the recipient's consent. **Status:** stub — expand with the later treatment in *Biddle v. Perovich* (1927), which limited the consent rule for commutations, and with the modern use of pardons to unlock compelled testimony. ## See also - [[Pardon Power]] · [[The Pardon and Clemency Pipeline]] - [[Ex parte Garland]] — the broad-power case this one qualifies - [[Fifth Amendment]] - [[How a Case Reaches the Supreme Court]]