# Iraqi PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces) The Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi, PMF) is an Iranian-directed paramilitary umbrella organization comprising approximately **67 primarily Shia armed factions** that operate within Iraq. Although nominally part of the Iraqi [[Armed Forces Hub]] and legally reporting to the Prime Minister, the PMF's most powerful factions openly pledge allegiance to Iran's Supreme Leader and take operational direction from the IRGC Quds Force. The PMF represents Iran's deepest institutional penetration of a sovereign state's security apparatus — a shadow army embedded within a nominal ally's military structure. In this KB's framework, the PMF is the proxy that most directly threatens U.S. forces in the region, having conducted dozens of attacks on American bases and personnel in Iraq and Syria throughout the 2023–2026 period. ## Origins: The Anti-ISIS Mobilization ### The 2014 Fatwa The PMF was formally established in June 2014 in response to ISIS's capture of Mosul and its advance toward Baghdad. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqis to volunteer for the fight against ISIS. Tens of thousands answered — but the organizational infrastructure that absorbed them was largely pre-existing Iranian-backed militia networks that had been fighting the U.S. occupation since 2003. ### Legalization - **November 2016**: Iraqi parliament passed Law No. 40, formally incorporating the PMF into the Iraqi security forces - The law granted PMF fighters military salaries, benefits, and pensions - Critical ambiguity: the law placed the PMF under the Prime Minister's authority, but the most powerful factions continued to answer to Iran ### [[Qasem Soleimani]]'s Architecture Soleimani personally designed the PMF's command structure, frequently visiting Iraq to coordinate operations. His January 2020 assassination at Baghdad Airport — where he was meeting with PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (also killed) — was a decapitation strike aimed at this Iranian command architecture. ## Key Factions The PMF contains dozens of groups, but power is concentrated in a handful of Iranian-directed factions: ### Tier 1: Direct IRGC Control **Kataib Hezbollah (KH)** - The strongest individual faction in the PMF - Founded March 2003 as a union of pro-Iranian groups following the U.S. invasion - Led by **Abu Fadak al-Mohammadawi** (PMF Chief of Staff), who openly declared in 2024 that the PMF takes orders from Khamenei - Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. (2009) - Conducted the March 14, 2026 drone attack that breached air defenses at Camp Victory - Received extensive training, funding, logistics, weapons, and intelligence from the Quds Force **Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) — "League of the Righteous"** - Third-largest Shia militia in Iraq - Founded 2006 as a splinter from Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army - Led by **Qais al-Khazali** - Equipped, funded, and trained by IRGC Quds Force from inception - Holds seats in Iraqi parliament, giving it political cover for military operations - U.S.-designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity **Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — "Movement of the Noble Ones"** - Founded 2013 as an AAH splinter - Led by **Akram al-Kaabi** - Deployed fighters to [[Syria]] to support Assad - Explicitly frames itself as part of Iran's "Islamic Resistance" ### Tier 2: Iranian-Aligned Political-Military Groups **Badr Organization** - Iran's **oldest proxy in Iraq** — formed in 1982 in Iran to fight Saddam Hussein - Originally known as the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - Led by **Hadi al-Amiri**, who fought alongside Iran in the Iran-[[Iraq War]] - The most politically integrated faction: holds parliamentary seats, runs government ministries - Initially funded, trained, equipped, and led directly by the IRGC - Provides the institutional core of the PMF bureaucracy **Saraya al-Khorasani** - Directly loyal to Khamenei - Named after the Khorasan region (eastern Iran) — an explicit Iranian identity marker **Kataib Imam Ali** - Added to the U.S. terror list in June 2025 - One of the most active factions in attacks on U.S. forces ### Tier 3: Reconnaissance and Provocation Units **Saraya Awliya al-Dam — "Guardians of Blood"** - Published footage on March 17, 2026 of a reconnaissance drone flying over the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad - Represents the newer, more provocative generation of PMF factions that specialize in demonstrating access to sensitive U.S. facilities ## Force Structure | Metric | Estimate | |--------|----------| | **Total fighters** | 100,000–150,000+ | | **Iranian-aligned factions** | ~67 groups | | **Budget (Iraqi state)** | $2.6 billion+ annually (Iraqi government funding) | | **Additional Iranian funding** | Hundreds of millions (estimates vary) | | **Parliamentary seats** | Multiple (through Badr, AAH, and affiliated parties) | The PMF is the second-largest military force in Iraq after the regular army, and in some areas operates more independently than the army itself. ## Weapons and Capabilities ### Arsenal | Category | Systems | Origin | |----------|---------|--------| | **Drones** | Iranian-designed attack and reconnaissance UAVs | Iran | | **Rockets** | Katyusha variants, 107mm, 122mm, 240mm | Iran/local | | **ATGMs** | Kornet, Iranian Toophan variants | Russia/Iran | | **IEDs/EFPs** | Explosively formed penetrators — signature IRGC weapon | Iran | | **MANPADS** | Various surface-to-air systems | Iran/captured | | **Ballistic missiles** | Short-range systems (transferred during Iran War) | Iran | ### The EFP Legacy Explosively formed penetrators — the deadliest weapon used against U.S. forces in Iraq during the 2003–2011 occupation — were an IRGC signature technology transferred to Iraqi militias. The same design lineage is used by PMF factions today. ## Attacks on U.S. Forces (2023–2026) ### Post-October 7 Escalation (October 2023–February 2024) Following the October 7 Hamas attack, Iraqi militias launched a sustained campaign against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria: - **170+ attacks** on U.S. bases and personnel in the first four months - Rocket, drone, and mortar attacks on Al Asad Airbase, Al Harir, Camp Victory, and others - The campaign paused in February 2024 after a U.S. retaliatory strike killed a senior Kataib Hezbollah commander ### Iran War Operations (February 2026–present) Since Operation Epic Fury on February 28, 2026, Iran has made Iraq a frontline: - **March 14, 2026**: Kataib Hezbollah drone breached Camp Victory air defenses - **March 17, 2026**: Saraya Awliya al-Dam flew reconnaissance drone over U.S. Embassy in Baghdad - Militia attacks on Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region - Continued rocket and drone attacks on U.S. facilities - Reports of Iraqi militia fighters crossing into Iran to support Iranian war effort ## The Sovereignty Problem The PMF presents a fundamental sovereignty paradox: ### Legal Status - Part of the Iraqi Armed Forces by law (2016) - Budget funded by the Iraqi state - Reports to the Prime Minister on paper ### Operational Reality - Most powerful factions take orders from Iran's Supreme Leader - Abu Fadak openly stated allegiance to Khamenei in 2024 - IRGC coordinates operations with Kataib Hezbollah and others - The PMF's autonomous military operations compromise Iraqi sovereignty ### Reform Attempts In March 2025, Iraq's parliament introduced a draft law to reform the PMF: - Formal subordination to the Prime Minister as commander-in-chief - Explicit distancing from "external influence" (i.e., Iran) - Integration into a unified national security structure - The Washington Institute warned that if the law instead strengthened Iranian control, the U.S. response should be "severe" The reform effort reflects Iraq's impossible position: caught between Iranian influence embedded in its security forces and American forces on its soil — both now at war with each other. ## U.S. Military Presence in Iraq Approximately **2,500 U.S. troops** remain in Iraq as part of the counter-ISIS coalition. A withdrawal agreement stipulates: - Hundreds to withdraw by September 2026 - Remainder by end of 2026 - Transition to a smaller bilateral presence The Iran war has complicated this timeline, as U.S. bases in Iraq are now active targets of Iranian-directed militia attacks. ## Connection to the KB Ecosystem - **[[Iran]]**: The PMF is Iran's most institutionally embedded proxy — not just a militia but a parallel state security structure within a sovereign country. Soleimani built this architecture personally. - **[[Iran War 2026]]**: Iraq is now an active front in the war, with PMF factions attacking U.S. forces and potentially sending fighters into Iran - **[[Hezbollah]]**: Kataib Hezbollah was modeled on Lebanese Hezbollah and maintains direct organizational ties. Harakat al-Nujaba deployed fighters to Syria alongside Hezbollah. - **[[Qatar]]**: Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and U.S. facilities in Iraq are connected nodes in the same force projection network — PMF attacks on one complement Iranian strikes on the other - **Defense tech**: PMF drone attacks on U.S. bases demonstrate the counter-drone challenge that companies like [[Anduril]] are positioned to address - **U.S. withdrawal dynamics**: The 2026 withdrawal timeline creates a paradox where the U.S. is simultaneously fighting from and withdrawing from Iraqi bases ## See Also - [[Iran]] - [[Iran War 2026]] - [[Hezbollah]] - [[Hamas]] - [[Houthis]] - [[Qatar]] - [[Defense Spending Landscape]]