# International Seabed Authority The body established under UNCLOS to govern the mineral resources of the international seabed — "the Area" — as the **common heritage of humankind**. 170 members, headquartered in Kingston. Around 31 exploration contracts, most of them in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, a 4.5 million km² abyssal plain between Hawaii and Mexico holding the world's densest polymetallic-nodule deposits. It is currently the site of the clearest live test in this vault of whether a multilateral regime can survive a great power deciding to route around it. ## The two-year rule On **25 June 2021** Nauru formally notified the Council under the 1994 Implementing Agreement, triggering an obligation to complete exploitation rules within two years — by 9 July 2023 — failing which the Council must consider a plan of work on the basis of whatever provisions exist. **The deadline passed with no regulations.** The Mining Code is still under negotiation. The manoeuvre is worth understanding: a state with a population under 13,000, sponsoring a subsidiary of a Canadian-founded Nasdaq-listed company, started a clock on the whole international regime. ## The American route around it The United States **signed but never ratified UNCLOS**. It is not an ISA member. Its Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980 was drafted as *interim* legislation to bridge to a treaty the US then expected to join. Executive Order 14285, signed **24 April 2025**, directed expedited review of applications under that 1980 act — that is, permits to mine seabed **beyond national jurisdiction**, issued by a state with no standing under the Part XI regime. [[The Metals Company]] filed within days. The ISA's response, in Secretary-General Carvalho's statement of 30 April 2025, sets out the legal case: > [!quote] International Seabed Authority, 30 April 2025 > The common-heritage status of the Area is unamendable; "no State may claim, acquire, or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area." All mineral activity there must be under ISA oversight, and **"it is common understanding that this prohibition is binding on all States, including those that have not ratified UNCLOS."** States parties, on this reading, have a **duty of non-recognition** of mineral rights granted outside Part XI. China called the US plan a violation of international law in April 2025. Member states at the 2026 Council warned of "regulatory chaos" and "a race to the bottom on environmental standards." ## The litigation nobody expected The first contentious cases ever brought before the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber are **not** state-versus-United States. They are **contractor-versus-regulator**. In July 2025 ISA members unanimously mandated an inquiry into whether contractors had breached their UNCLOS obligations by pursuing US permits over the same ground. In March 2026 the Legal and Technical Commission identified **NORI and TOML** — both [[The Metals Company]] subsidiaries — as requiring specific attention for possible non-compliance. They filed at ITLOS in mid-2026 alleging denial of due process and seeking to suspend the inquiry. **On 18 July 2026 the Chamber refused to suspend the inquiry**, but ordered the ISA to observe due process, clarify the basis of the identification, and report by 31 August 2026. On jurisdiction it found prima facie authority, reasoning that due-process obligations are not sheltered by UNCLOS Article 189's limits on reviewing the Authority's discretionary powers. And then, on **20 July 2026**, the ISA Council **extended NORI's exploration contract by five years** — while the compliance inquiry into that same contractor remained unresolved. The Council also declined an additional October session, **pushing mining-code negotiations to March 2027**. TOML's contract expires 11 January 2027 and its extension has not been considered. At the Assembly in late July 2026, states discussed requesting an **advisory opinion** on whether international law permits unilateral seabed mining by a non-party, and whether other states must recognise US-issued permits. Russia and China backed it; African states, New Zealand, Norway, France, Singapore, Jamaica and Canada were supportive but urged caution. **No consensus. Malta will lead consultations and the decision is deferred to 2027.** ## The pattern this fits A consensus-bound multilateral body, unable to complete its own rules, watching a non-member issue permits over ground it claims to govern, while its own contractors sue it. Compare the [[Kimberley Process Certification Scheme]], which spent a year unable to elect a chair and three years without a communiqué while the G7 built a parallel diamond-traceability scheme that pointedly does not mention it. The failure mode is the same: **unanimity buys universality and then forecloses reform**, and the states that find the result intolerable build something else outside. ## See also [[Conflict Minerals Watchlist]] · [[Deep-Sea Mining]] · [[The Metals Company]] · [[Minerals Diplomacy]] · [[Critical Minerals]] · [[Conflict Resources Atlas]]