# Russia Sanctions Relief Ledger A dated record of the major steps the second Trump administration took toward [[Russia]], from inauguration on January 20, 2025 to October 2026. It lists **both directions**: the steps that eased pressure on Moscow or cut support for [[Ukraine]], and the steps that added pressure. Every row is backed by the sources listed with this page, and the totals at the bottom are a plain count of the rows. **Reading the table.** ⬇️ **Eased** = relief for Russia or less support for Ukraine. ⬆️ **Pressure** = new costs for Russia or more help for Ukraine. ↔️ **Diplomacy** = talks and proposals. ⚪ **Not counted** = rows recorded for completeness but left out of the totals. The table covers major policy steps, not every routine license or weapons delivery. ## 2025 | Date | What happened | Direction | Instrument | |---|---|---|---| | Feb 5, 2025 | Attorney General [[Pam Bondi]] disbanded Task Force KleptoCapture, which chased sanctioned oligarchs' assets, and the FBI's Foreign Influence Task Force, and narrowed criminal enforcement of [[FARA]]. | ⬇️ Eased | Justice Department memo | | Feb 12, 2025 | First Trump–Putin call of the term; negotiations announced. See [[Trump-Putin Call 2025-02-12]]. | ↔️ Diplomacy | Phone call | | Feb 24, 2025 | At the UN General Assembly, the U.S. voted **against** Ukraine's resolution on the war's third anniversary (it passed 93–18–65). | ⬇️ Eased | UN vote | | Feb 24, 2025 | The [[UN Security Council]] adopted a U.S.-drafted resolution (2774) calling for a swift end to the war without naming Russia as the aggressor. | ⬇️ Eased | UN Security Council Resolution 2774 | | Feb 28, 2025 | Trump and [[JD Vance]] berated [[Volodymyr Zelensky]] in the Oval Office; the planned minerals deal was not signed. See [[Trump-Zelensky Oval Office Meeting]]. | ↔️ Diplomacy | Meeting | | Early Mar–Mar 11, 2025 | The U.S. paused military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine; both resumed on March 11 after Ukraine accepted a proposed 30-day ceasefire at talks in Jeddah. | ⬇️ Eased | Executive decision | | Apr 2, 2025 | Russia was left off the [[Liberation Day Tariffs]] list. The White House said existing sanctions already "preclude any meaningful trade." | ⬇️ Eased | Tariff order (omission) | | Early Apr 2025 | Treasury removed Karina Rotenberg, wife of Putin ally Boris Rotenberg (see [[Rotenberg Brothers]]), from the sanctions list, without explanation. Britain, Canada and Australia kept her sanctioned. | ⬇️ Eased | OFAC delisting | | Apr 30, 2025 | The U.S. and Ukraine signed a minerals deal creating a joint reconstruction investment fund, two months after the Oval Office clash derailed it. | ⬆️ Pressure | Bilateral agreement | | Jul 1–9, 2025 | The Pentagon under [[Pete Hegseth]] paused some weapons shipments to Ukraine, including Patriot interceptors, for a stockpile review; shipments resumed about a week later. | ⬇️ Eased | Pentagon decision | | Jul 14, 2025 | With NATO's [[Mark Rutte]], Trump threatened "secondary tariffs" of about 100% if there was no deal in 50 days, and announced that NATO allies would buy U.S. weapons for Ukraine. Broad secondary tariffs were never imposed. | ⬆️ Pressure | Announcement | | Aug 6, 2025 | Trump added a 25% tariff on Indian goods over India's purchases of Russian oil. | ⬆️ Pressure | Executive order | | Aug 15, 2025 | Trump hosted Putin at the [[Anchorage Summit 2025]]; no ceasefire. | ↔️ Diplomacy | Summit | | Aug 28, 2025 | The State Department approved the sale to Ukraine of 3,350 extended-range air-launched missiles (ERAM), worth up to $825 million. | ⬆️ Pressure | Foreign military sale | | Sept 2025 | The first weapons packages for Ukraine paid for by NATO allies were approved, according to Reuters. | ⬆️ Pressure | Allied-funded sales | | Oct 2025 | The Financial Times and other outlets reported that U.S. intelligence was helping Ukraine target Russian energy infrastructure for long-range strikes. | ⬆️ Pressure | Intelligence support (reported) | | Oct 17, 2025 | The day after a long call with Putin ([[Trump-Putin Call 2025-10-16]]), Trump told Zelensky he would not provide Tomahawk cruise missiles, at least for now, according to people briefed on the meeting. | ⬇️ Eased | Decision | | Oct 22, 2025 | Treasury sanctioned [[Rosneft]] and [[Lukoil]], Russia's two largest oil companies, and 34 subsidiaries: the **first new Russia sanctions of the term**. | ⬆️ Pressure | Treasury designation | | Oct–Nov 2025 | The [[28-Point Peace Plan]], drafted after a meeting between envoy [[Steve Witkoff]] and Putin adviser [[Kirill Dmitriev]], leaked. It would have recognized Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk as de facto Russian, capped Ukraine's army, barred NATO membership, and lifted sanctions in stages. | ↔️ Diplomacy | Draft plan | | Dec 2025 | The administration lobbied EU governments against lending Ukraine money backed by frozen Russian central-bank assets, according to Bloomberg and Politico. | ⬇️ Eased | Diplomatic pressure | ## 2026 | Date | What happened | Direction | Instrument | |---|---|---|---| | Feb 6, 2026 | Trump lifted the 25% India tariff after India committed to stop buying Russian oil. | ⬆️ Pressure (goal met) | Executive order | | Feb 24, 2026 | On the war's fourth anniversary, the U.S. abstained on Ukraine's UN peace resolution (passed 107–12–51); a U.S. amendment to strip its territorial-integrity language failed 11–69–62. | ⬇️ Eased | UN vote | | Mar 5, 2026 | Days into the [[Iran War 2026]], Treasury allowed delivery to India of Russian oil already at sea (General License 133). | ⬇️ Eased | OFAC general license | | Mar 12, 2026 | The license was widened to **all buyers** of Russian oil loaded by March 12, and the U.S. price cap was suspended (General License 134, to April 11). See [[Russia and Iran Oil Sanctions Waivers 2026]]. | ⬇️ Eased | OFAC general license | | Apr 17, 2026 | Reissued after a six-day lapse, to May 16, for oil loaded by April 17 (General License 134B). | ⬇️ Eased | OFAC general license | | May 18, 2026 | Extended again, after a two-day lapse, to June 17 (General License 134C). | ⬇️ Eased | OFAC general license | | Sept 18, 2026 | Trump signed the [[Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026]], passed 86–11 and 262–159, mandating sanctions and authorizing tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy, subject to a presidential waiver. | ⬆️ Pressure (Congress) | Statute | | Oct 9, 2026 | After a call with Putin, Treasury licensed sales of Russian diesel, including into the U.S., through April 7, 2027. See [[US-Russia Diesel Deal 2026]]. | ⬇️ Eased | OFAC General License 135 | | Oct 10–14, 2026 | U.S. intelligence officials warned Ukraine they would stop sharing intelligence if it kept striking Russian refineries. Zelensky confirmed the warning and said it had not been carried out; Trump said the U.S. was still sharing. | ⚪ Not counted (warning only) | Warning | | Oct 15, 2026 | Treasury extended wind-down licenses letting Lukoil's foreign gas stations and Bulgarian entities keep operating, to April 24, 2027. Transfers to Russia stay barred; the licenses mainly protect Western fuel supply. | ⚪ Not counted (technical) | OFAC licenses | | Oct 16, 2026 | Two days before they took effect, Trump waived nearly all of the Graham Act's sanctions and tariffs, with no end date. | ⬇️ Eased | Executive order | ## The count | | 2025 | 2026 (to Oct 22) | Total | |---|---|---|---| | ⬇️ Eased | 9 | 7 | **16** | | ⬆️ Pressure | 7 | 2 | **9** | | ↔️ Diplomacy | 4 | 0 | **4** | | ⚪ Not counted | 0 | 2 | **2** | Neither 2026 "pressure" row was new pressure from the White House: one lifted the India tariff after India agreed to stop buying Russian oil, and the other is a law Congress passed and the President then waived. The March–June oil relief appears as four rows because each license was a separate decision to grant or extend it. Most of the pressure rows are help for Ukraine (a minerals deal, a missile sale, intelligence for strikes) rather than new costs imposed on Russia. The administration's single largest sanctions move, on Rosneft and Lukoil, came nine months into the term. The Senate Banking Committee's Democratic staff counted at least 32 Russia sanctions rollouts in each of the war's first three years, and one in the fourth (February 2025 to February 2026). > [!warning] Disputed — the Cyber Command pause > In early 2025 several outlets reported that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered [[US Cyber Command]] to stand down from planning against Russia. The Pentagon said on March 4, 2025 that no operations had been cancelled or delayed. In May 2025 Representative [[Don Bacon]], a Republican, said publicly that "it was a one-day pause." It is not counted in the table. **Belarus, not counted.** The administration also eased sanctions on [[Belarus]] in 2025 and 2026, including its national airline and potash producers, each time in exchange for the release of political prisoners. Those moves did not change Russia sanctions. ## Why it matters Read as a list, the record runs mostly one way. In its first nine months the administration imposed no new sanctions on Russia while easing pressure in other ways, even as it kept selling weapons to Ukraine. In 2026, the energy emergency created by the Iran war was answered with repeated licenses for Russian oil and then diesel. And a law Congress passed by wide bipartisan margins to penalize the buyers of Russian energy was waived before it took effect. The administration's case is that easing energy sanctions lowered fuel prices and kept talks with Moscow alive; the futures market's reaction to the diesel license, and the absence of a ceasefire, are the evidence on the other side. For what that money does, see [[How Russian Oil Pays for the War]] and [[Deportation of Ukrainian Children]]. ## See Also - [[How Russian Oil Pays for the War]] — the mechanism behind every row - [[Trump-Russia Arc Timeline]] · [[Trump-Putin Calls Timeline]] · [[Ukraine War Timeline]] - [[Sanctions Designation Pipeline]] — why licenses, not delistings, are the main tool of relief - [[Secondary Sanctions]] · [[Dark Fleet]] - [[Russia]] · [[Ukraine]] · [[Vladimir Putin]] · [[Steve Witkoff]]