# United States v. Fokker Services > [!note] Stub > This is a short entry that hasn't been fully written yet. 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir., decided **5 April 2016**) — the decision that emptied out the judicial role in a [[Deferred Prosecution Agreement]]. A district court had refused to approve a DPA with a Dutch aerospace services company on the ground that the terms were too lenient and that no individual had been charged. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that "a district court lacks authority to disapprove a DPA under § 3161(h)(2) on the ground that the prosecution has been too lenient," and that "the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA" — including on concerns that the government should have brought different charges or charged different defendants. What survives of the statutory phrase "with the approval of the court" is a single narrow inquiry: whether the agreement is "geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law" rather than "a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act's time constraints." Paired with [[United States v. HSBC Bank USA]] a year later, it settles the practice in the two circuits where most corporate resolutions are filed. Never reviewed by the Supreme Court. Mapped against the other three corporate exits in [[Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreement Crosswalk]]. ## See also - [[United States v. HSBC Bank USA]] · [[Deferred Prosecution Agreement]] · [[Speedy Trial Act]] - [[Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreement Crosswalk]] · [[How a Federal Prosecution Begins and Ends]] - [[Prosecutorial Discretion]] · [[Elite Impunity]] · [[Judiciary Hub]]