# New START New START was the last treaty limiting the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. Signed in Prague in 2010 under [[Barack Obama]], in force from 2011, extended once in 2021, it capped each side at **1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery vehicles**, with on-site inspections and twice-yearly data exchanges. **It expired on 5 February 2026.** For the first time since 1972, there is no negotiated limit on American and Russian strategic nuclear forces, and no verification regime of any kind. ## How It Ended The treaty could not be extended again — the 2021 extension used the only one the text allowed. A successor required negotiation, and none happened. | Date | Development | |---|---| | 2023 | Russia suspends participation in inspections; data exchanges lapse | | Sept 2025 | Kremlin offers to observe the central limits for one year past expiry, without verification. Trump initially calls it "a good idea" | | **2026-02-05** | **Treaty expires.** Trump rejects the Russian proposal, calling instead for "a new, improved, and modernized Treaty" | | 2026-02-06 | Under Secretary of State Thomas DiNanno tells the Conference on Disarmament that any new agreement must cover Russian systems and "the breakout growth of Chinese nuclear weapons stockpiles" | | 2026-02-11 | Lavrov: Russia will hold strategic force levels steady "if the United States does so as well" | | 2026-02-17 | Assistant Secretary Christopher Yeaw, asked about a reported gentlemen's agreement: "I know of no such agreement" | **What exists now is a unilateral, conditional Russian restraint declaration and nothing else.** Not a mutual moratorium, not a political commitment, not a binding instrument. Moscow says it will hold if Washington holds; Washington has not said it will hold. China continues to refuse trilateral talks. ## What Is Actually Deployed The Nuclear Notebook figures as of February 2026: total active US stockpile around **3,700**, with roughly **1,770 deployed strategic warheads** — about 400 on ICBMs, 970 on SLBMs, 300 at bomber bases — plus about 100 tactical bombs in Europe, some 1,930 in reserve, and around 1,342 retired awaiting dismantlement. Total inventory roughly 5,042. **Unchanged from the previous year.** The change is not in the numbers but in the ceiling that used to bound them. Both sides retain large reserves that can be **uploaded** onto existing delivery systems. FAS estimates the US ICBM force could go from 400 to 800 warheads and SLBMs add 400–500; Russian ICBMs could add roughly 400. CFR reported $62 million designated to reopen previously closed missile tubes on Ohio-class submarines, and the potential to deploy an additional **1,900 warheads within a decade** through upload alone. > [!warning] No upload has been announced > As of mid-August 2026 the United States has **not announced any increase in deployed strategic warheads**, and there is no verified evidence of a Russian upload either. What has happened is that the infrastructure enabling one has been funded. Do not conflate capability with action. Separately, reporting in August 2026 indicated the Pentagon under [[Elbridge Colby]] is drafting a revised nuclear strategy emphasizing **tactical** weapons to widen presidential options in regional conflicts — citing the B61-12 in Europe, the W76-2 low-yield Trident warhead, and a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile by the end of the decade. No specific warhead-number increase was announced. ## Why It Matters Here New START is the single clearest instance in this vault of a constraint ending **by expiry rather than by decision** — and that distinction is why it belongs beside the withdrawal pages rather than among them. Nobody withdrew. No memorandum was signed, no notice deposited, no Federal Register entry filed. The treaty had a date on it, the date arrived, and the negotiation that would have replaced it did not occur. See the [[US Treaty and Organization Withdrawal Timeline]], where this is the one line with no instrument attached to it. That makes it the fifth mechanism alongside exit, procedural strangulation, defunding, and capture: **letting the clock run out.** It is the least visible of all of them, requires no affirmative act, and is the hardest to attribute — which is precisely why the [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] review conference three months later deleted the language calling on both parties to maintain the limits. Reaffirming a lapsed constraint would have required someone to own the lapse. ## See Also - [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]] — where the lapse became a diplomatic fight - [[INF Treaty]] — the previous arms-control instrument to end - [[US Strategic Nuclear Weapons]] · [[Nuclear Arms Control]] - [[Elbridge Colby]] — drafting the successor posture - [[Russo-Ukrainian War]] — the conflict that ended inspections in 2023 - [[US Treaty and Organization Withdrawal Timeline]]