# US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement Signed **4 December 2025**, alongside the [[Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity]] and a parallel US–Rwanda instrument. This is the substantive document of the 2025–26 minerals turn, and its terms are unusually far-reaching. ## How it started In February and March 2025, with [[M23]] taking Goma and Bukavu, [[Félix Tshisekedi]] publicly offered American companies preferential access to Congolese minerals in exchange for security backing. A lobbying apparatus assembled within weeks — **Ballard Partners** signed its DRC contract the same day the administration froze foreign aid, later reported at $100,000/month; **Earhart Turner** took $5 million for six months; Rwanda retained **Yorktown Solutions** at $80,000/month. The DRC had been the largest single recipient of US humanitarian aid globally in 2024, at $910 million. ## What it commits the DRC to Per Public Citizen's January 2026 analysis, co-published with Friends of the Congo, the United Methodist Church's GBCS and Earthworks: - A **Strategic Asset Reserve** — an "evolving list" of mining sites reserved for US companies, expanded "in consultation with the United States" - A **right of first offer** for US companies on those sites, **ahead of Congolese investors** - A commitment to **amend Congolese mining law, tax policy, and potentially the constitution within twelve months** - **Ten-year tax stabilisation** for US operators - **US majority ownership** in projects governed by the partnership - A Joint Steering Committee of five representatives each, deciding by consensus - **Quarterly briefings to the US ambassador** The DFC issued letters of interest of roughly $1 billion each for mining and infrastructure. The first Joint Steering Committee met in February 2026. ## The constitutional challenge **It was never presented to the Congolese parliament.** In January 2026 Congolese lawyers and human-rights defenders filed in the **DRC Constitutional Court**, arguing violations of Article 214 (ratification of agreements altering domestic law), Articles 9 and 217 (sovereignty over natural resources) and Article 12 (equality before the law). The core argument is simple: amending national law or the constitution requires parliamentary approval or a referendum, and an executive agreement cannot commit the state to doing so. **No ruling has been reported as of August 2026.** More than fifty members of the US Congress raised concerns about consultation and transparency; over thirty-five US civil-society organisations called for a halt. ## The third-term problem Carnegie's Christian-Géraud Neema reported in July 2026 that **Tshisekedi is citing the agreement's constitutional-reform language as justification for an amendment enabling a third term**. His warning to Washington: "Tshisekedi is implicating Washington in his pursuit of a third term. Staying silent may prove detrimental to the United States in the long run." A national *ville morte* shutdown protest against the amendment took place on 3 June 2026. The Council on Foreign Relations frames the dynamic as "minerals for regime security." ## What has actually moved - **3 February 2026** — [[Glencore]] agrees in principle to sell 40% of its Congolese copper-cobalt assets at ~$9bn enterprise value to a consortium including the **US DFC**, with production rights directed under this agreement. Non-binding, not closed. - **5 February 2026** — the DRC formally presents the [[Rubaya Coltan Mine]] for the Strategic Asset Reserve, while M23 holds it. - **[[KoBold Metals]]** holds 13 exploration licences; the Manono lithium it was expected to acquire is shipping under Chinese control. - Guinea and Morocco signed comparable MOUs; Argentina, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, Australia and Japan signed related critical-minerals instruments across 2025–26. > [!note] The pattern to watch > Compare the **US–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund** (April 2025): announced at enormous scale, and eighteen months on its concrete achievements are digitising 60,000 Soviet-era geological documents and planning core drilling. In minerals diplomacy, **announced value and realised value are different quantities**, and the gap is where the political work happens. Jean-Claude Mputu of *Le Congo n'est pas à vendre*, on the wave of agreements: "This is a race for minerals at any cost... These agreements are negotiated in total opacity... no promises have been made on human rights. None." ## See also [[Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity]] · [[Félix Tshisekedi]] · [[Rubaya Coltan Mine]] · [[Glencore]] · [[KoBold Metals]] · [[Critical Minerals]] · [[Conflict Minerals Hub]]