# Germany **Germany** is the vault's most closely tracked European far-right case, because the [[AfD]] offers the cleanest test of whether a cordon sanitaire holds once a nationalist party reaches a plurality. It is also the source of the [[Stab in the Back Myth]], the template for betrayal narratives the vault traces forward into American politics. > [!note] Canonical country record > This page owns the bare name **Germany** and is the default target for `[[Germany]]`. > Its history is at [[German History Hub]]. > A page covering its influence operations directed at the United States, if one is built, belongs in /Foreign Influence/ under an adjectival title and does **not** claim this name. ## Why it appears in this vault - [[AfD]] — also filed as [[Alternative for Germany]] - [[2026 Saxony-Anhalt State Election]] and [[Ulrich Siegmund]] — the September 2026 breakthrough - [[Stab in the Back Myth]] — the exported grievance template - [[INF Treaty]] — the arms-control thread ## Economy and the US link *Figures as of 10 October 2026; each reading is dated.* | Indicator | Reading | |---|---| | Nominal GDP | About $5.45 trillion — IMF 2026 projection (April 2026 WEO); third-largest economy after the US and China | | Real growth | +0.2% in 2025, after −0.9% (2023) and −0.5% (2024); +0.3% q/q and +1.0% y/y in Q2 2026 | | Inflation | 3.3% y/y, September 2026 flash; energy +14.9% | | Central bank | [[European Central Bank]] — deposit rate 2.50% after a 25 bp hike on 10 September 2026, effective 16 September (the second hike of 2026) | | US goods trade, 2025 | US exports $82.8B · imports $155.8B · US deficit $73.0B (Census; 2024 deficit $84.6B) | | Largest US imports from Germany, 2025 | Capital goods $56.3B · consumer goods $34.3B · vehicles and parts $29.0B (BEA) | | German holdings of US Treasuries | $103.1B, December 2025 — small next to the UK or Japan | | US tariff on most German goods | 10% or 12.5% "net of MFN" under Section 301 since 24 July 2026; [[Section 232]] duties on cars, steel and aluminium sit outside that layer | **The export model under pressure.** Among large economies, Germany entered the tariff era already stalled. Output shrank in 2023 and 2024 and grew 0.2% in 2025 — three years of stagnation — and Destatis named "higher US tariffs" and falling vehicle exports among the reasons when it published the 2025 figure on 15 January 2026. Exports to the United States fell about 9% in 2025 (9.3% for the full year as reported by Reuters; 9.4% for January–November in Destatis data reported by Moneycab). Moneycab put the January–November drop in car and car-part shipments to the US at 17.5%, to €26.9 billion. The German surplus with the US fell to €52.2 billion, the lowest since 2021, and Reuters reported that China overtook the US as Germany's largest trading partner. The first half of 2026 brought a modest turn: exports led Q2 growth, and manufacturing value added rose year on year for the first time since early 2023. **How the tariff got here.** The [[Liberation Day Tariffs]] set the EU rate at 20% in April 2025. The July 2025 US–EU framework replaced it with a 15% rate on most goods, inclusive of ordinary duties, and cut the Section 232 car tariff on EU vehicles to 15%. [[Learning Resources v. Trump]] voided the IEEPA layer on 20 February 2026, leaving the Section 122 10% surcharge until 24 July 2026. Since then the EU sits in a separate band of the [[Section 301 Forced Labor Tariffs]] — alongside Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Switzerland — at 10% or 12.5% "net of MFN" depending on the product. Goods already under Section 232 are not covered by the new 301 duties, so Germany's carmakers and steelmakers still pay the 232 rates that survived the Supreme Court. **The fiscal turn.** On 18 March 2025 the outgoing Bundestag amended the Basic Law with 512 votes, a week before a new parliament in which the [[AfD]] and the Left could have blocked a two-thirds majority. Defence spending above 1% of GDP is now exempt from the debt brake, a €500 billion fund was created for infrastructure and climate investment, and the states may borrow up to 0.35% of GDP. In July 2026, answering [[Donald Trump]]'s complaint that the defence-spending balance was "ridiculous" and "one-sided", [[Friedrich Merz]] committed to double the defence budget within four years and reach NATO's 3.5% core target by 2029. That borrowing now meets an ECB that is raising rates into an energy shock from the [[Iran War 2026]]. **Why it matters here.** Germany sits in two American right-wing arguments at once: the ally that under-spent on defence, and the exporter whose car trade the tariffs were built to punish. The stagnation those tariffs deepened is also the economic backdrop to the AfD's rise recorded above. ## See Also - [[German History Hub]] - [[World History Hub]] - [[Global Economy Hub]]