# Cuba **Cuba** is the canonical country record. The vault's substantive material on it sits in the pages below; this record exists so the bare name resolves to the country itself rather than to one aspect of it. > [!note] Canonical country record > This page owns the bare name **Cuba** and is the default target for `[[Cuba]]`. > Its influence operations directed at the United States are at [[Cuban Influence]]. > No history hub exists for it yet. ## September 2026 — regime change moves onto the record | Date | Development | |---|---| | 2026-05-21 | [[Marco Rubio]] says the administration would prefer a negotiated settlement in Cuba to a collapse | | 2026-09-22 | [[Donald Trump]] tells the [[UN General Assembly]] the Cuban government is "an absolutely failed state… it will fall," and says Rubio "is handling a negotiation. He's deep into negotiations with Cuba." **The Cuban delegation walks out of the hall.** | | 2026-09-23 | Rubio says the United States is open to talks conditioned on a change of government — "Cuba has a golden opportunity to place itself on an irreversible path towards a better future" — and would work with Cuban figures whose "hands are not stained with blood." **Cuban officials deny that any negotiations exist.** | | 2026-09-26 | CBS News reports an internal Army message canvassing whether the **Army Reserve** could supply [[Combatant Commands]] — specifically U.S. Southern Command — with support formations "possibly needed in 90-120 days." Multiple U.S. officials say the planning relates to Cuba; the memo itself names no country. Trump tells reporters "Cuba and us will make a deal" and says he does not believe military action will be necessary. | Cuba is the second hemispheric regime-change file the [[Second Trump Administration]] has opened, and the framing is explicitly the one [[Venezuela]] established: American pressure, an oil-or-investment inducement, and a successor the administration can work with. The Venezuelan precedent is also the reason to read the sequence carefully — there, removing the man at the top left the governing party and security services intact within forty-eight hours. See [[Spheres of Influence]] for the doctrine Trump attached to the Cuba passage. > [!warning] Unresolved > Whether a negotiation track actually exists is contested: the President and the Secretary of State describe one, and Havana denies it. Both claims are recorded; neither is treated as established. ## The Army Reserve canvass — September 2026 The document CBS News described is not an order and not a deployment. It is a **readiness question**, which is the step that precedes both. The units canvassed are the ones an occupation or a stabilization mission needs rather than the ones a strike needs: | Formation requested | Function | |---|---| | Combat sustainment support battalion | Logistics coordination | | Expeditionary sustainment command | Theater-level logistics oversight | | Engineer battalion | Construction, infrastructure | | Medical brigade | Theater medical support | | Forward resuscitative and surgical detachment | Far-forward trauma surgery | | Military police brigade | Law enforcement, detention, population control | Commands were told to respond by **September 25, 2026**. A Southern Command spokesperson declined to discuss specifics, citing operational security, and confirmed only continuous coordination with the Joint Force. Two things are worth separating. The memo's silence on Cuba is not evidence against the reporting — contingency canvasses routinely name a combatant command rather than a target, and the identification comes from officials rather than the document. But a memo is also not a decision, and Trump's same-day remark that a deal will be reached and force will not be needed is on the record beside it. What the **composition** tells you is the part that does not depend on either claim. Military police, engineers, medical brigades and sustainment commands are the footprint of holding ground and administering a population. If this list reflects the planning assumption, the operation being sized is not a strike. > [!warning] Unresolved > Whether this planning is a live option, a prudent contingency, or leverage inside the negotiation Rubio describes and Havana denies cannot be determined from the available record. Recorded as reported, with the 90–120 day window noted because it places any decision point in the **December 2026 – January 2027** range. ## See Also - [[Cuban Influence]] - [[World History Hub]] - [[UN General Assembly]] — the 22 September 2026 walkout - [[Marco Rubio]] - [[Venezuela]] — the template being applied - [[Spheres of Influence]] - [[Combatant Commands]] — the SOUTHCOM record - [[CBS News]]