# Removal Power The Constitution says how officers are appointed ([[Appointments Clause]]) and almost nothing about how they are fired. That silence is the ground on which the [[Unitary Executive Theory]] has been fought for a century. The question is always the same: may Congress protect an officer from being fired at will, usually with a "for cause" standard, or does Article II's grant of "the executive Power" to one President forbid it? ## The case line | Case | Year | Holding | |---|---|---| | *Myers v. United States* | 1926 | The President may remove executive officers at will; Congress cannot require Senate consent to a firing. | | [[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]] | 1935 | Carve-out for multi-member "quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial" commissions such as the FTC, whose members Congress may protect for cause. | | *Wiener v. United States* | 1958 | Protection implied for an adjudicatory body (the War Claims Commission) even without statutory text. | | *Bowsher v. Synar* | 1986 | Congress cannot keep removal power over an officer who executes the laws. | | [[Morrison v. Olson]] | 1988 | Upheld for-cause protection for an [[Independent Counsel]]; the test "does not turn on whether or not that official is classified as 'purely executive.'" | | *Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB* | 2010 | Two stacked layers of for-cause protection are unconstitutional. | | [[Seila Law v. CFPB]] | 2020 | Struck protection for a single-director agency and narrowed *Morrison*. | | *Collins v. Yellen* | 2021 | Same result for the single-director FHFA. | | [[Trump v. Slaughter]] | June 29, 2026 | **Overruled *Humphrey's Executor*.** 6–3, Roberts writing: FTC commissioners are removable at will. Sotomayor, for the three dissenters, called it a "profound bait and switch." | | [[Trump v. Cook]] | June 29, 2026 | 5–4, Roberts writing, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson: the attempted firing of Fed Governor [[Lisa Cook]] was "erroneous and void." | ## The 2025–26 settlement The second Trump administration tested the line directly, firing Democratic members of the FTC, the NLRB and the MSPB in 2025. The Court signalled the outcome early with emergency stays that let the firings stand. It confirmed it in *Slaughter*: every multi-member commission is now under direct presidential control. The [[Federal Reserve]] came out differently, but the precise reason matters. *Cook* did not declare the Fed constitutionally exempt. The Court held that "for cause" in the Federal Reserve Act means something: the President must give the governor some explanation of the evidence, a way to respond, and a deadline. Whether cause exists depends on the seriousness of the alleged misconduct and its connection to the governor's duties. Cook got none of that process, so the removal failed. The Fed's insulation survives because the statute and a single vote hold it in place, not because of a constitutional rule. ## The special counsel exception For the [[Special Counsel]], the question is different in kind, because the protection is regulatory, not statutory. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(d) limits removal to "the personal action of the Attorney General" on five grounds, and § 600.10 makes that limit unenforceable by anyone. The remaining check is indirect and political: the President cannot remove a special counsel directly, but can remove an [[Attorney General]] who refuses to. ## See also - [[Special Counsel Appointment and Removal Flow]] · [[How a U.S. Attorney Is Appointed and Removed]] · [[Unitary Executive Theory]] - [[Humphrey's Executor v. United States]] · [[Morrison v. Olson]] · [[Seila Law v. CFPB]] · [[Trump v. Slaughter]] · [[Trump v. Cook]] - [[Appointments Clause]] · [[Inferior Officer]] · [[Saturday Night Massacre]]