# Legislative Veto A provision in a statute allowing Congress — or one chamber, or in some versions a committee — to nullify an executive action by resolution, **without** presenting that resolution to the President for signature or veto. Between the 1930s and 1983 Congress wrote legislative vetoes into roughly two hundred statutes, using them as the price of broad delegations of authority to the executive branch. [[INS v. Chadha]] (1983) held the device unconstitutional. Any congressional action with "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons outside the legislative branch" is legislative in character, and must therefore satisfy both bicameralism and the Presentment Clause. A one-house veto failed presentment; a two-house concurrent resolution failed it too. The consequence for war powers is the structural fact behind [[War Powers Decision Flow]]: § 5(c) of the [[War Powers Resolution]] relied on a [[Concurrent Resolution]] to compel withdrawal, and *Chadha* left it unenforceable. The 1983 amendments substituted an expedited [[Joint Resolution]], which the President may veto — converting a simple-majority exit into a two-thirds exit. The same inversion appeared in the [[National Emergencies Act]], whose original concurrent-resolution termination mechanism was replaced for the same reason.