# Conflict Minerals Watchlist The live layer of [[Conflict Minerals Hub]]. Ten open questions whose answers will change what the cluster's other pages say. **Status verified 11 August 2026.** Where nothing has moved, that is stated — "no change since X" is information. | # | Item | Status | Latest | |---|---|---|---| | 1 | ITLOS Cases 34 & 35 | **Moving** | ISA ordered to report by **31 Aug 2026** | | 2 | US–China rare earth truce | Quiet | Expires **10 Nov 2026** | | 3 | H.R. 7085 (§1502 repeal) | Stalled on calendar | Union Calendar No. 481, **19 Mar 2026** | | 4 | §78m(p) presidential waiver | No response found | Requests **3 Apr** and **3 Jun 2026** | | 5 | DRC Constitutional Court v. SPA | Pending, no ruling | Last coverage **5 May 2026** | | 6 | Tshisekedi third term | **Major movement** | Court upheld referendum law **28 Jul 2026** | | 7 | Glencore–Orion $9bn | Still non-binding | Restated **5 Aug 2026** | | 8 | Eastern DRC / M23 | Deadlocked, active | **7 Aug 2026** | | 9 | Wa State / Man Maw tin | No change since March | LME tin **$55,900/t, 10 Aug 2026** | | 10 | NOAA / BOEM deep-sea | No permit issued | Lease sale **19 Nov 2026** | --- ## 1. ITLOS Cases 34 and 35 — the deep-sea legal fight The Seabed Disputes Chamber's **unanimous order of 18 July 2026** prescribed three provisional measures: the [[International Seabed Authority]] must observe due process in both the compliance inquiry and the contract-extension procedure; must clarify the questions put to [[The Metals Company]]'s subsidiaries; and both parties must avoid aggravating the dispute. **Compliance reports are due 31 August 2026.** On the merits it found prima facie jurisdiction and held that due-process observance is "extraneous to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers" — read by commentators as recognising **judicially enforceable procedural rights for seabed contractors**, which is new. Meanwhile the ISA Council **extended NORI's exploration contract by five years on 20 July 2026**, while the compliance inquiry into that same contractor remained unresolved. It also declined an extra October session, **pushing mining-code negotiations to March 2027**. TOML's contract expires 11 January 2027 and its extension has not been considered. ## 2. The Busan truce Agreed 30 October 2025, **operative from 10 November 2025, expiring 10 November 2026** — note the date, which is commonly given as late October. **No reporting either way on renewal, extension or breakdown.** The last authoritative statement was a senior US official in May 2026 saying the pact "remains in force" with discussions continuing, after Trump left the Beijing summit without a confirmed rare-earth deal. China has not been idle inside the truce: a State Council order in March 2026, a ministry enforcement and traceability framework in April, a violation-reporting mechanism effective 1 July, and **ten US entities added to the export-control list in June 2026 — including [[MP Materials]].** ## 3. H.R. 7085 Ordered reported by House Financial Services on 22 January 2026 by **30–24**, formally **Reported (Amended) and placed on the Union Calendar, No. 481, on 19 March 2026**. **No floor action since.** No Senate companion found — treat that as unconfirmed rather than established. ## 4. The presidential waiver request Both requests confirmed: the National Association of Manufacturers to the State Department on **3 April 2026**, and House Financial Services leadership to the President on **3 June 2026**, urging him to "revise, waive, or terminate." **No response from State or the White House has been reported. No SEC rulemaking, no proposed rescission.** The only executive action in the window is a **20 July 2026 executive order** on defence-contractor critical-minerals provenance, tightening bill-of-materials tracing from 1 January 2027 — which does not mention Section 1502 or 13(p). Adjacent, not responsive. See [[Dodd-Frank Section 1502]]. ## 5–6. The Congolese constitutional track **The SPA challenge is still pending with no ruling reported.** As of May 2026 it was described as the only open variable that could materially shift the enforcement timeline. This is genuinely absence of evidence, not a confirmed dismissal. **The third-term track has moved sharply.** Parliament adopted a referendum-organisation law in mid-June 2026 permitting a constituent assembly to propose constitutional revision on a finding of "major institutional dysfunction." On **17 July 2026** the Constitutional Court declined competence over a pre-adoption challenge; on **28 July 2026** it declared the law **admissible and constitutional**, with reservations on provisions touching presidential powers. [[Félix Tshisekedi]] has not yet promulgated it and no referendum is scheduled. The opposition coalition rejected the ruling on 29 July and called a mobilisation for **15 August 2026**. His second term ends in 2028. Read alongside Carnegie's July 2026 finding that Tshisekedi is citing the [[US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement]]'s legal-reform clause as justification for the amendment — which implicates Washington in it. ## 7. Glencore–Orion Still an MOU. [[Glencore]]'s H1 2026 results on **5 August 2026** carry only a footnote: the transaction "remains subject to due diligence, the execution of legally binding documentation and any applicable regulatory approvals." No change in terms, no termination, no closing. The footnote does confirm that the consortium includes the **US International Development Finance Corporation**. ## 8. Eastern DRC The **sixth Joint Oversight Committee met in Paris on 24 July 2026**, where Rwanda formally rejected the DRC's FDLR disarmament plan as "crude manipulation." Kinshasa's plan conditions demobilisation on secure cantonment without forced extradition, and argues it cannot act while Rwanda controls five of six designated operational zones. See [[FDLR]]. The Doha prisoner exchange, stalled since April, broke on **6–7 August 2026** when the ICRC moved 15 M23-affiliated detainees — the first movement since April. Fighting continues on the Bukavu and Fizi axes. **No new sanctions since the 2 March 2026 designations** of the Rwanda Defence Force and four senior officers. ## 9. Wa State tin **No specialist reporting since 3 March 2026.** The dewatering cost-share took effect 1 March; deeper dewatering was projected to take over a month. China's March 2026 tin ore imports from Myanmar were **up 224% year-on-year**, confirming real recovery. **LME tin cash settled at $55,900/t on 10 August 2026** — historically elevated. See [[Man Maw]]. ## 10. Deep-sea permitting **No commercial recovery permit has been issued anywhere.** [[The Metals Company]]'s consolidated application was found in full compliance on 1 May 2026; remaining steps are certification, draft and final environmental impact statements, then a decision. TMC guides to before the end of Q1 2027. BOEM issued the **Proposed Leasing Notice on 16 July 2026** over roughly 31 million acres off American Samoa, with the sale set for **19 November 2026**. **No litigation has been filed** against either the NOAA rule or the lease sale, despite over 70,000 opposing public comments and a local organisation vowing to fight it. --- ## How to use this page Update it, don't rewrite the analysis pages, until something actually resolves. When an item resolves, fold the outcome into the substantive page and retire the row. The three most consequential open items, in order: **the November truce expiry**, because it governs the entire [[Critical Minerals]] posture; **the Congolese constitutional track**, because it determines whether the SPA survives contact with Congolese law; and **the first deep-sea permit**, because nothing about [[Deep-Sea Mining]] is settled until one issues or is refused. ## See also [[Conflict Minerals Hub]] · [[Minerals Diplomacy]] · [[Conflict Resources Atlas]] · [[Conflict Minerals Ecosystem]] · [[Conflict Minerals Timeline]]