# KoBold Metals A machine-learning mineral-exploration company backed by roughly every name in Silicon Valley — Breakthrough Energy Ventures, Andreessen Horowitz, Bezos, Jack Ma, Branson, Bloomberg, Sam Altman — and the flagship American corporate entry into Congolese mining under the 2025–26 minerals-diplomacy push. ## The DRC position - **7 May 2025** — framework agreement with AVZ Minerals to acquire AVZ's interests in the **Manono lithium deposit**. The Oakland Institute values the associated commercial framework at around **$1 billion**. - **18 July 2025** — exploration agreement covering more than **1,600 km²** in southern DRC, outside the conflict zones. - By 2026 KoBold holds **13 exploration licences** in southeastern Congo, with roughly $20 million spent and $50 million planned by Q1 2027. KoBold publicly thanked [[Marco Rubio]] and [[Massad Boulos]] for "opening doors for US investment." ## The Manono problem This is where the announcement and the asset diverge, and the divergence is instructive. Manono is the subject of a multi-year ownership fight. AVZ Minerals lost control of the project and has pursued ICC and ICSID arbitration against the Congolese state holding company Cominière and against Zijin. The current ownership on the ground is **Zijin 54.9% / Cominière 35.1% / DRC government 10%** — a **Chinese-controlled** structure. AVZ publicly claimed the DRC–KoBold arrangement violated an arbitration order. On **22 July 2026 the DRC certified the first batch of lithium for export from the Zijin-controlled Manono project** — Congo's first lithium exports ever. > [!warning] Do not state that KoBold "won" Manono > Whether KoBold ever completed the AVZ acquisition, and whether AVZ's claims survive, is unresolved in public sources as of August 2026. What is not in doubt is who is physically shipping the lithium, and it is not an American company. ## Why the page matters KoBold is the test case for whether the [[US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement]] converts diplomatic access into producing assets, or produces the same gap between announced value and realised value visible in the Ukraine minerals agreement. So far the announcements are large, the licences are real, and the tonnage is Chinese. ## See also [[US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement]] · [[Critical Minerals]] · [[CMOC]] · [[Conflict Minerals Ecosystem]]